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1. LOCAL FINANCE OF VARIOUS KINDS AND 
VARIOUS LOCAL FINANCE REFORM 
PLANS 
The reform of local finance forms the main subject for 
debate in the National Policy Council, and consequently it is 
now receiving the earnest study of the Enquiry Bureau of 
the Cabinet. In Japan, local finance means prefectural, 
municipal, town and village finance, and, therefore, the ques-
tion of the reform of local finance covers a very wide field, 
so that different methods of settlement can be devised to 
suit different cases_ 
Prefectural finance is organised comparatively uniformlY 
all over the country, but municipal, town and village finance 
is organised on fundamentally different lines according as it 
is urban or rural. Urban finance-especially the finance of 
big cities-centres around enterprises_ In revenue, incomes 
from enterprises, including items of fees and rents, constitute 
no small portion of the total, while in expenditure also, 
defrayals on account of enterprises, which take the form of 
expenses in connection with the supply of gas and electricity, 
etc., account for the major part of the total. Thus, both in 
revenue and in expenditure, enterprises form the nucleus of 
the finance of big cities. This remark is, of course, made in 
reference to the gross revenue and expenditure. As regards 
pure revenue, the incomes from municipal taxes constitute a 
large proportion, while the educational expenditure forms an 
important item of pure expenditure. In rural finance, that 
is, in the finance of towns or villages, little or no financial 
significance attaches to enterprises. In it, the educational 
expenditure more or less matches the revenue from town or 
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village taxes, and so the pure expenditure of the educational 
cost is met by the pure revenue in the shape of incomes 
from town or village taxes. There are few items, such as 
enterprises, that contribute both to revenue and to expendi· 
ture. Rural finance, which centres in compulsory collective 
economy, and urban finance, in which compulsory collective 
economy and private economy operate conjointly, must 
be dealt with differently in the matter of financial reform. 
Again, the question of the special municipality system 
claims much attention in considering the reform of urban 
finance. Far be it from me to judge of the merits or 
demerits of any administrative organisation merely on the 
basis of the relative administrative cost involved, but the 
fact that the six big cities (Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, 
Yokohama and Nagoya), whose total expenditure in the 
fiscal year 1934-1935 amounted to ¥ 669,000,000 (in both 
general and special accounts), are placed under the supervi· 
sion of the six prefectures (Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, 
Kanagawa and Aichil, the total expenditure of which 
in the same fiscal year was ¥ 158,000,000 (which, though. 
represents general accounts only 1 cannot but make me feel 
that there is something abnormal about the present system. 
As local finance, as already mentioned, is not similarly 
constituted, it would be of little practical value to urge the 
reform of local finance without sufficient discernment, since 
such reform could not be achieved by one and the same 
method. Different plans must be devised for the reform of 
differently constituted local finances. 
The reform of local finance-an issue which is now 
prominently to the fore-does not by· any means aim at the 
detection of defects common to all kinds of local finance and 
at their removal by common methods. Regarding urban 
finance-the finance of big cities especially-pu blic utility 
enterprises, which are proving intolerable burdens on the 
treasuries of the big cities in Japan, ought to claim priority 
of attention. In exculsive reference to the six big cities, 
the introduction of the special municipality system calls for 




a good deal of attention in connection with financial refonn. 
It is regrettable to observe that these phases of the problem 
are not attracting the attention of the National Policy 
Councilor the Enquiry Bureau of the Cabinet at all. 
The keynote of the reform of local finance is the estab-
lishment of an equilibrium between urban and rural financial 
burdens. The projected refonn aims at the removal of any 
inequality that may be found in the burden of taxation be-
tween rural districts, chieflY inhabited by farmers, and urban 
districts, whose inhabitants are largely merchants and indust· 
rialists. In Japan, local finance in variety of reform plans 
are conceivable, but the fact remains that the establishment 
. of an equilibrium between urban and rural tax burdens 
forms the pivot of the reform of local finance. 
2. CONCENTRATION OF POPULATION AND 
WEALTH IN BIG CITIES 
How is it that the present unfairness in the incidence 
of the burden of taxation has arisen between urban districts 
chiefly inhabited by merchants and industrialists and rural 
districts whose inhabitants are mainly farmers, for the elimi-
nation of which many people are now advocating the intro-
duction of a new system of grants-in-aid for the adjustment 
of local finance? The answer to this question is that, as a 
result of the revolutionary changes in economic life, the 
centre of Japanese economic power has shifted from rural to 
urban districts. This has caused a remarkable loss of balance 
between urban and rural economic power, with the result 
that whereas financial life in urban districts with enormous 
economic power is easy, small towns and villages with 
limited economic power are in financial straits, despite the 
imposition of heavy taxes and public imposts. Such being 
the case, if the question of the reform of local finance is 
to be tackled properly, all phases of this disproportions 
between urban and rural economic power must first of all 
be probed. 
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1. Concentration of population in big cities. The domi-
nant factor in economic life being human, it is necessary to 
study the question of population in considering the problem 
of inequality between urban and rural economic power. We 
find that, on the dates given in the table, Japan's population 
was distributed among the rural districts, the six big cities, 
and the other cities as follows: 
Table No.1 
Diahibution of population between urban and rwal diab'icta. 
I Total population Per mille 
I Oct. 1, I Oct. 1. I Oct. I, Oct.l, Oct.1'1 Oct. I, 
I 
1920 1925 1930 1920 1925 1930 
Rural districts 145.866,295 46.539,972 49,005,705 820 784 760 rb;g I 118 Urban cities 5,479,086 6,608,992 7,604,954 98 111 
d"stricts 
I ~ge~therI4,617,672 6,287,858 7,539,346 82 105 122 
It is indisputable that there is a steady increase in both 
urban and rural population and that rural population is 
very ·much larger than urban. But another noteworthy fact 
is that the percentage of urQan population has steadily be-
come higher. It is worth mentioning in this connection that 
whereas in the case of most prefectures in Japan, the num· 
ber of people who leave their prefectures to settle down 
elsewhere is larger than the number who migrate into them, 
iust the contrary is the case with the six prefectures (Tokyo, 
Osaka, Kyoto, Kanagawa, Hyogo and Aichi prefectures) in 
which the six big cities are located, and with Fukuoka 
prefecture, the Hokkaido and Miyazaki prefecture. With 
regard to the Hokkaido and Miyazaki prefecture, this pheno-
menon is accounted for by the fact that they are both 
sparsely populated and therefore afford room for coloni-
sation. Regarding the influx of population into the other 
prefectures referred to, it illustrates the concentration of 
population in big cities. As the settlers are mostly those in 
the prime of life, the prefectures which they desert lose 
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many people of productive capacity, while the prefectures 
into which they migrate gain these able· bodied people. 
Classified according to ages, the population of the six cities, 
as compared with that of the other cities, shows the follow· 
ing interesting figures (the figures given are for 1930);-
Let the vertical lines denote scales of age, with the 
number of men and women of the corresponding ages reo 
corded horizontally on either side of the vertical lines, and 
then we find that the population of the Japanese Empire 
shows itself in the shape of an isosceles triangle, or in the 
so·called pyramid of population. If we compare the popula· 
tion of the six big cities with that of all other districts, 
interesting phenomena manifest themselves. In the case of 
six big cities, the number of men is larger than that of 
women, and in the pyramid, the part representing the full· 
age class distends, while in the case of the districts other 
than the six big cities, the number of men and women is 
fairly equal and the portion of the full'age class in the 
pyramid shows a contraction. It must be noted that the 
results of the census merely show the state of the distribu· 
tion of the population on the night of the census; they reo 
present the population in a static state. In order to visualize 
the population in a dynamic state, it is necessary to find 
how it is distributed in the day·time. The diagram given 
shows the day·time population in the central part of Tokyo. 
It indicates that the number of men disproportionately larger 
than that of women. Old people and children constitute only 
a small fraction, while full'age adults of both sexes figure 
prominently. This shows that full'age men and women 
constitute the major part of the day·time population in the 
central part of Tokyo. Local peculiarities corne out clearly 
when the population is studied in the light of age classifica· 
tion. Of the total population children under 14 represented 
29.7 per cent. in the six big cities in 1930, citizens of pro· 
ductive ages between 15 and 59 years 65.8 per cent., and 
those over sixty 4.5 per cent. In the districts other than the 
six big cities, the children formed 37.6 per cent., people of 
- - ------ --- ---------~- --.. -.-~--. 
Table No.2. Population, as cl6Ssified by ages. 
(a) Total population. 
Oct, 1, 1920 ~ ..•. Oct, 1, 1925 Oct. 1, 1930 
Ages S' b' " I Districts other S' b- .. ! Districts other Six big cities I Districts other _~~~_1~_~ ___ than six !>Jg cities IX Ig Cities than six big cities than six big cities 
Male Female h.fale I Female --Male T Female J Male I Female Male I Female I Male J Femide 
0- 4 287,791 283,207 3,464,831 3,421,881 381,230 372,047 3,779,249 3,732,057 458,85l! 448,821 1,009,H't 4,127,17 
5- 9 262,05( 254,02 3,205,1OE 3.135,735 284,931 277,765 3,206,24C 3,155,496 354,118 :145,2,13 3,542,882 3,498,76 
10-14 292,00( 250,49 2,797,225 2,761,844 342,249 309,864 3,068,742 3.014,175 343,679 309,655 :1,071,381 2,992,34' 
15-19 407,564 301,972 2,341,45i 2,388,063 501,354 390,033 2,487,016 2,506,873 572,780 459,347 2,708,880 2,531,6!K 
20-24 351,728 286,37 1,964,751 2,006,457 439,836 356,402 2,134,963 2,129,326 505,177 420,631 2,304,983 2,221,38 
25-29 284,26 227,531 1,723,73' 1,688,413 354,981 285,941 1,901,521 1,851,028 414,957 339,962 2,094,373 1,973,07 
30-34 236,311 196,6!! 1,597,132 1,579,391 274,66~ 220,593 1,645,500 1,575,317 327,866 269,764 1,821,094 1,673,26 ' 
35-39 199,672 173,93 1,508,091 1,529,029 235,250 192,549 1,533,288 1,488,290 257,089 209,489 1,555,781 1,519,531 
40-44 174,474 150,943 1,465,780 1,452,567 197,819 170,418 1,426,405 1,427,123 217,315 180,557 1,520,885 1,463,47' 
45-49 128,875 113435 1,211,52\ 1,204,728 166,606 148,815 1,369,882 1,366,846 178,355 159,662 1,380,I15 1,385,351 
SO-54 08,411 93,193 1,023,829 1,019,32\ 119,875 109,004 1,103,956 I,II8,06B 147,982 138,961 1,290,098 1,29O,03f 
55-59 71,264 71,253 840,821 856,755 85,237 86,652 895,998 922,930 100,577 100,932 1,014,793 1,077,06! 
60-64 54,98: 62,24l 748,05< 790,530 56,192 62,106 697,808 752,235 66,203 76,876 738,317 811,12 
65-69 35,21 47,64S 579,261 6S0,413 38,200 47,714 563,275 643,151 39,816 51,337 546,354 627,66' 
70-74 18,241 :10,307 381,291 466,771 21,33£ 34,44 382,219 481,178 23,625 :16,774 347,415 480,22 
75-79 7,21 15,515 191,035 268,244 8,880 18,261 204,752 291,121 10,787 21,266 212,2n 296,73< 
80- 2,71 7,59 87,459 152,422 3,24£ 9,491 97,39£ 174,396 4,145 12,349 1l2,B4t 221,651 
----- .----.-,- .- --------
- - -------
-------
.. '-- -.--- -_ ..... _-- . ----- ------- -- ~. -- .,,-- ---_ . . - .-
Total 2,912,790 2,566,296 5,131,395 25,352,572 3,514,89( 3,094,10, 6,49B,21~ F6,629,611 4,023,331 3,581,61E ?8,271,552 ~8,180,54' 
Grand I 
., 
'1 Total 5,479,086 I 50,483,967 I 6,608,992 53,127,630 7,604,954 5d,462,096 
. - . -_._._----
(b) Ralio. ot populalion tper 10,000) 
Oct. I, 1920 Oct. I, 1925 Oct. I, 1930 
Ages Six big cities Districts other Six big cities Districts other Six big cities Districts other than six big cities than six big cities than six big cities 
Male I Female Male I Female Male I Female Male I Female Male I Female I Male Female 
0- 4 525 517 686 679 577 564 712 701 604 5B9 710 731 
5--9 478 464 635 621 431 420 604 593 466 453 621 620 
lG-14 533 457 554 547 518 469 578 567 452 406 544 530 
15--19 744 552 464 469 758 591 468 471 754 603 4SO 448 
Z(}.-24 642 523 389 397 665 540 402 400 665 551 408 393 
25-29 519 415 341 334 537 432 358 348 546 446 371 349 
30--34 431 359 317 313 416 334 310 296 431 353 323 296 
35-39 364 317 299 303 356 291 289 2SO 338 274 275 269 
40-44 319 275 290 288 299 258 269 269 286 236 269 259 
45--49 235 207 240 239 251 225 258 257 235 210 245 245 
EO-54 ISO 170 203 202 181 165 206 211 195 181 228 228 
55-59 130 130 166 170 129 131 169 174 132 143 ISO 191 
60--64 101 114 148 151 B5 94 132 142 87 101 131 144 
65-69 64 87 115 129 58 15 106 121 52 61 97 111 
70-74 33 55 15 92 32 52 12 91 31 48 62 85 
75-19 13 28 38 53 13 28 39 55 14 28 38 52 
80- 5 14 11 30 5 14 18 33 5 16 20 39 
-
--~ 
Total 5,316 4,684 4,917 5,023 5,311 4,683 4,990 5,010 5,293 4,101 5,008 4,992 
Grand 10,000 10,000 10,000 I 10,000 10,000 10,000 Total 
THE PIVOT OF LOCAL FINANCE REFORM 63 
productive ages 54.6 per cent., and the aged 7.8 per cent. 
In the central part of Tokyo in 1929, children under 15 
constituted 7.9 per cent., citizens of productive ages between 
16 and 60 vears 90.3 per cent., and those over 61 years 1.8 
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the total number of men and women of productive ages in 
the six big cities, men of these ages represented 35.8 per 
cent. of the population and women 30 per cent., a fairly 
wide disparity being thus observable between them. In the 
districts other than the six big cities, on the other hand, 
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men and women of these ages were 27.8 and 26.8 pet cent. 
of the total population respectively-only a slight difference. 
The disparity is marked between the male and female popu-
lation in the central part of TokYo, where the percentage of 
the entire population was 71 for men and 19.3 for women. 
In short, the tables and diagram given above clearly 
show that a large number of men in the prime of life have 
moved from their agrarian villages to big cities-the six big 
cities especially-and that the population of those cities has 
increased more than may be accounted for by the extension 
of their areas through the inclusion of the neighbouring 
towns and villages. 
There is a concentration of population in big cities. 
Since most of those who move from their agrarian villages 
to big cities are people in the prime of manhood, it is quite 
natural that wealth should concentrate in big cities. It is 
difficult to determine whether the concentration of wealth is 
due to the concentration of population or whether concentra· 
ted wealth induces the concentration of population, but the 
fact is undeniable that there exists a close connection be· 
tween the two, each operating on the other either as cause 
or as effect, with the result that both population and wealth 
continue to concentrate in big cities. 
2. Concentration of wealth in big cities. Whereas it is 
easy to find the extent of the concentration of population by 
statistical means, a variety of means must be employed in 
order to make clear the extent of the concentration of wealth. 
In Japan, persons with an annual income of ¥ 1,200 or more 
are required by the income tax law to pay the C·c1ass 
income tax, which provides for progressive rates according 
to the amount of income. By finding the percentage of 
the tax·paying households, it is possible to discover the 
minimum number of persons with an annual income of 
¥1,200 or more, while by making use of the figure available 
concerning the tax·payers to whom different progressive 
rates are applied, the gulf between the rich and poor can be 
gauged, The figures obtained in reference to the fiscal year 
.. _----_._ .. _- _ .. _--
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1933-1934 are given in the following table:-
H?useholds I ~~rcentage 
of the 
Tj ~ .. ~!mpson 
Households which pay of tax-pay- • actual rela-C-class in- ing house- Pareto line tive average 
come tax holds difference 
Six big I I 
1 
2,554;670 221,265 8.7 I 1.5338 1.005193 cities 
I 
All other 10,426,647 348,320 3.4 1.7600 0.817109 districts 
While in the six big cities, 8-7 per cent. of the total 
households are paying the C·cIass income tax, only 3.4 per 
cent. are paying it in the districts other than the six big 
cities. This shows that the level of incomes for the inhabi· 
tants of big cities is much higher than that for the inhabi· 
tants of rural districts. It can also be inferred from u. of 
the Pareto line, which shows the extent of the gulf between 
the rich and poor inversely, and from ~' of the Simpson plan, 
which shows it in direct proportion, that the gulf between 
the rich and poor is wider in the six big cities than in the 
districts other than the six big cities, 
In order to see the trend of the concentration of wealth 
in big cities, I have looked into the total revenues from the 
C·cIass income tax in the eight years following 1926 inclusive. 
The results are given in the following table:-
1926 1927 192811929 1930 11931 11932 1933 
Whole country 
(In ¥1,OOO,OOO) 2,731 2,585 2,491 2,553 2,469 2,023 1,835 2,007 
Six big cities 
(In Y 1,000,000) 817 814 837 878 846 732 837 904 
Percentage of six I I 
big cities to whole 29.9 32.5 33.6 34.4 34.31 36.2 [ 45.6 45.1 
country 
It will be seen from the above table that the revenue 
from this tax in the six big cities, which represented less 
than 30 per cent, of the total revenue in 1926, went on 
growing year after year until its percentage rose to 45 per 
cent. in 1933. 
1 
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Needless to say, the C·c1ass incomes embody the incomes 
of such persons only as earn ¥1,200 or more a year; they 
do not include the incomes which fall short of the taxable 
point. Nor do they include interest on public bonds, deben· 
tures or bank deposits. In any case, the fact that the per· 
centage of the revenue from the C·c1ass tax in the six big 
cities, which, in 1926, was less than 30 per cent. of the total 
revenue from this source, was in excess of 30 per cent. in 
1927 and later years and rose to 45 per cent. in 1932 and 
in 1933, eloquently testifies to the concentration of wealth in 
the six big citias. When it is remembered that the popula· 
tion of the six big cities is 10 per cent. or thereabouts of 
the total population of Japan, it will be seen that the con· 
centration of wealth is more marked than the concentration 
of population in these cities. 
3. HOW THE BALANCE IS LOST BETWEEN URBAN 
AND RURAL ECONOMIC POWER 
In the preceding chapters, attention has chiefly been 
directed to the investigation of the relative economic position 
of the six big cities and the districts other than the six big 
cities. Now, the economic power of individual local districts 
must be looked into. To this end, it is advisable to gauge 
the economic power of cities, towns and villages, but since 
the number of the cities, towns and villages on April 1st, 
1933, was no fewer than 12,663, I have decided to defer an 
inquiry into their respective economic power to a future 
occasion. My present inquiry into inequality in the economic 
power of different districts is confined to the 47 administra· 
tive districts into which the country is divided, that is, the 
Hokkaido and 46 prefectures. 
1. Prefectural economic power of various descriptions. 
Local economic power can be made clear through investiga· 
tion by various standards. Table No. 3 shows population, 
. the rental value of land, private property, C·class incomes, 
and direct national tax charges, as classified according to 
prefectures. 
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Table No.3. 
Prefectural economic power of various descriptions. 
(8) Actual numbers. 
K.enta., Direct Da-
Prefectures Population value of Private C·class tionaltax land property incomes charges 
(Itl ¥l,OOO' (In ¥l,OOO,OOO, (In '§!Il,OOO) (In '91.(00) 
Hokkaido 2,812,335 25,887 3,553 71,668 6,882 
Aornori 879,914 19,722 850 10,609 1,705 
IWate 975,771 19,988 1,102 11,736 1,887 
Miyagi 1,142,784 30,027 1,252 20,610 2,997 
Akita 987,706 31,942 1,240 13,552 2,814 
Yamagata 1,080,034 34,979 1,358 16,009 3,282 
Fukushima 1,508,150 38,003 1,633 17,129 3,067 
lbaraki 1,487,097 45,894 2,076 18,155 3,266 
Tochiki 1,141,737 34,080 1,605 19,899 2,991 
Gumma 1,186,080 27,978 1,502 20,676 2,553 
Saitama 1,459,172 41,560 1,851 22,217 3,487 
Chiba 1,470,121 46,106 1,922 22,818 3,726 
Tokyo 5,408,678 180,428 9,933 478,016 81,714 
Kanagawa 1,619,606 38,146 2,481 63,404 8,405 
Niigata 1,933,326 64,298 2,624 32,612 6,552 
Toyama 778,953 27,369 I,Oa6 16,705 2,791 
Ishikawa 756,835 23,506 1,062 15,286 2,232 
Fukui 618,144 18,870 951 11,180 1,786 
Yamanashi 631,042 13,147 688 9,729 1,290 
Nagano 1,717,118 42,947 2,321 24,692 3,750 
Gifu 1,118,405 32,966 1,844 19,002 2,859 
Shizuoka 1,797,805 38,978 2,791 34,958 4,545 
Aichi 2,567,413 72,595 4,176 88,498 13,108 
Mie 1,157,407 32,795 2,047 23,459 4,350 
Shiga 691,631 26,048 1,089 14,799 3,743 
Kyoto 1,552,532 41,569 2,131 90,383 9,787 
Osaka 3,540,017 IOB,498 4,796 250,384 38,995 
Hyogo 2,646,301 79,636 4,198 165,049 20,212 
Nara 596,225 16,303 982 13,288 2,021 
Wakayama 830,148 18,017 1,134 15,917 2,243 
Totton 489,266 13,913 655 8,445 1,154 
Shimane 739,507 22,050 1,008 12,777 2,031 
Okayama 1,263,962 41,544 1,835 30,963 4,406 
Hiroshima 1,692,138 40,931 2,271 47,521 5,480 
Yamaguchi 1,135,637 33,924 1,885 30,838 3,835 
Tokushimn 716,544 11,873 783 8,534 1,268 
Kagawa 732,816 20,387 737 10,807 1,633 
Ehime 1,142,122 26,679 1,464 22,632 3,067 
Kochi 718,152 16,564 988 10,546 1,417 
Fukuoka 2,527,119 60,582 4,452 81,614 10,277 
Saga 691,565 23,518 1,043 10,333 1,890 
Nagasaki 1,233,362 21,728 1,766 27,823 3,017 
Kumamoto 1,353,993 40,163 1,632 3~,311 3,991 
Oita 945,771 26,381 1,335 19,802 2,363 
Miyazaki 160,467 18,479 914 11,880 1,590 
Kagoshima 1,556,690 33,200 2,021 20,658 2,692 
Okinawa 577,509 4,488 411 2,632 329 
Average 1,371,277 36,909 1.946 43,051 6,359 
- ---~---~~-- ~--~~-
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Population value of Private C·dass tional tax Prefectures land property incomes charges 
(%) (%) (%) I (~~) I (%) 
Hokkaiko 204 70 182 I 167 109 
Aomori 64 54 ~I 25 27 Iwate 71 54 27 30 Miyagi 83 81 65 48 47 
Akita 72 87 64, 32 44 
Yamagata 79 95 70 1 37 52 
Fukushima 110 103 84 I 40 I 48 
Ibaraki 109 124 1~ I 42 29 Tochiki 83 92 ~I 47 Gumma 87 76 ~I 42 Saitama 107 Il3 52 I 55 
Chiba 108 125 991 53 59 
Tokyo 393 487 510 I 1,106 1 1,295 Kanagawa 118 103 127 147 133 
Niigata 149 174 135 76
1 
104 
Toyama 57 74 53 39 44 
Ishikawa 54 64 55 36 35 
Fukui 45 51 49 26 28 
Yamanashi 46 36 36 23 20 
Nagano 126 116 Il9 57 59 
Gifu 86 89 95 44 45 
Shizuoka 132 106 143 81 72 
Aichi 186 197 213 206 208 
Mi. 85 89 105 55 68 
Shiga 51 71 56 :-14 43 
Kyoto 114 113 110 210 155 
Osaka 257 293 245 580 616 
Hyogo 192 216 215 384 :120 
Nara 44 44 51 31 32 
Wakayama 61 49 59 37 35 
Tottori 36 38 34 20 18 
Shimane 54 60 52 30 32 
Okayama 94 113 95 72 69 
Hiroshima 124 111 116 111 86 
Yamaguchi 83 92 97 72 60 
Tokushima 52 48 40 20 22 
Kagawa 53 55 38 25 30 
Ehime 83 72 76 53 48 
Kochi 52 45 51 25 22 
Fukuoka 184 164 228 190 168 
Saga 51 64 54 24 30 
Nagasaki 90 59 91 64 47 
Kumamoto 99 109 84 77 68 
Oita 69 72 69 46 37 
l\1Iyazaki 56 50 47 28 54 
Kagoshima 114 90 104 48 25 
Okinawa 42 12 21 6 5 
Average 100 100 100 100 100 
... ~-.---~ _._--
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Population claimed my first attention. as economic life 
of all kinds is based on it. The figures of population adopted 
are those of the census taken by the Statistical Bureau of 
the Cabinet on October 1st, 1930. The rental value of land 
is a datum necessary for the appraisal of the revenue 
accruing from privately-owned land. The figures here used 
are those revealed by the inquiry made by the Taxation 
Bureau of the Finance Department. They represent the 
rental value ruling on April, 1st, 1926. The figures for 
private property are those obtained by the Statistical Bureau 
of the Cabinet in its inquiry into the national wealth at the 
end of 1930. The C·class incomes and the direct national 
tax charges given in the above table are those for the fiscal 
year 1931-1932. Since the C·c1ass incomes represent the in· 
comes of individuals, they are of value in an inquiry into 
the incomes of the inhabitants of various districts. The C-
class incomes in this table do not embody the taxable incomes 
only; they also include the "amount deducted, on account 
of loss" the "amount deducted under Articles 15 of the 
Tax Law", and the "amount deducted under Article 16 of 
the Tax Law." By the direct national taxes are meant 
eight taxes, viz., income, land, business profit (business tax), 
interest on capital, succession (death duties), mining, and 
Exchange business taxes. The economic power of all pre· 
fectures has been investigated under these five items. In 
order to show the characteristic features of individual pre-
fectures, all calculations have been made on the basis of 
the index number which takes the arithmetic average as 
100. In the first place, both the maximum and the minimum 
were found, and the upper quartile, the lower quartile. and 
the median were added. Furtber. in order to see the form 
of local inequality. the skewness from quartiles (q2~~I) q2 1 
was calculated, while the mean deviation and the standard 
deviation (which is the same as the coefficient of variation 
because it is the index number) were additionally shown so 
as to make clear the extent of local inequality. Table No. 
4 gives the details;-
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Table No.4. 
Inequality of Prefectural economic power. 
, 
"' ! Max. Q, M M, Q, Min·i a 5 I 
Population 393 114 100 83 54 36 43 64 +0.033 
Rental value 
of land 487 113 100 87 55 12 45 76 -0,103 
Private 
property 510 lIO 100 83 53 21 49 80 -0.053 
C·class 
incomes 1,106 76 100 46 30 6 94 179 +0.304 
Direct na· 
tional tax 1,295 89 100 47 30 5 94 200 +0.128 
charges 
The above table shows that skewness is smallest in 
population (+ 0.033) and biggest in the C·class incomes 
( + 0.304), these two offering a singular contrast with each 
other. Deviation is also smallest in population (mean devia· 
tion: 43; and standard deviation: 64). It is somewhat 
bigger in the rental value of land (mean deviation: 45; and 
standard deviation: 76) and in private property (mean devia· 
tion: 49; and standard deviation: 80), which represent 
wealth most closely associated with the localities concerned, 
while it is biggest in the C-class incomes (mean deviation: 
94; and standard deviation: 179), which embody wealth 
most closely connected with the inhabitants of the localities. 
In consequence, the deviation in direct national tax charges 
(mean deviation: 94; and standard deviation: 201) is also big. 
2. Changes in inequality in prefectural economic power. 
Let me now proceed to make clear whether the loss of 
balance between prefectures in economic power has grown 
or diminished with the lapse of time. Of the five items 
mentioned in the above table, I have left out, in this particu-
lar study, the rental value of land and private property as 
we have hitherto had only one official investigation regard-
ing them. The item of direct national tax charges is also 
left out, since it embodies the results of the taxing of 
. - --- ------- .. _- -----
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Table No.5. Prefechlral population and incomes. 
(a) Actual numbers. 
C·class in- I C·class in-
Prefectures Population Population comes in i comes in in 1920 in 1925 1921 I 1926 
I (In ¥1,OOO) i (In ¥1,OOO) 
Tokyo 3,699,839 4,485,144 412,707 492,542 
Osaka 2,587,847 Hg:!~ 225,097 284,598 Hokkaido 2,359,183 72,532 89,999 Hyogo 2,301,799 141,888 185,162 
Aichi 2,089,762 2,319,494 102,835 111,349 
Fukuoka 2,188,249 2,301,668 115,159 114,852 
Niigata 1,776,474 1,849.807 78,629 68,235 
Shizuoka 1,550,387 1,671,217 54,099 58,095 
Nagano 1,562,722 1,629,217 61,297 65,944 
Hiroshima 1,541,905 1,617,880 61,437 60,661 
Kanagawa 1,323,390 1,416,792 78,567 66,069 
Kagoshima 1,415,582 1,472,193 29,914 31,910 
Kyoto 1,287,147 1,406,382 84,955 103,320 
Fukushima 1,362,750 1,437,596 39,321 34,778 
Ibaraki 1,350,261 1,409,092 41,662 37,693 
Chiba 1,336,155 1,399,257 41,360 37,557 
Saitama 1,319,261 1,394,461 42,772 39,257 
Kumamoto 1,233,233 1,296,086 58,976 59,910 
Okayama 1,217,698 1,238.447 51,058 46,796 
Nagasaki 1,136,182 1,163,945 42,372 I 41,164 
Gumma 1,052,610 l,ll8,858 39,439 1 37,688 Gifu 1,070,407 1,132,557 36,034 35,575 
Mie 1,069,270 1,107,692 42,440 37,608 
Miyagi 961,768 1,044,036 32,490 I 35,521 
Ehime 1,046,720 1,096,388 34,397 :)6,855 
Tochiki 1,046,479 1,090,428 45,426 38,293 
Yamaguchi 1.041,013 1,09l,544 57,235 47,960 
Yamagata 968,925 1,027,297 38,482 35,085 
Akita 898,537 936,408 :l3,536 31,134 
Iwate 845,540 900,984 20,230 21,306 
Oita 860,282 915,136 39,105 33,406 
Acmari 756,454 812,977 19,119 19,213 
Wakayam~ 750,411 787,511 23,155 23,876 
Toyama 724,276 749,243 30,262 29,345 
Miyazaki 651,097 691,094 19,231 20,859 
Ishikawa 747,360 750,854 26,877 24,131 
Shimane 714,712 722,402 28,243 24,164 
Kagawa 677,852 700,308 21,542 19,128 
Kechi 670,695 687,478 16,497 17,475 
Tokushima 670,212 689,814 16,763 14,132 
Shiga 651,050 682,412 23,995 22,909 
Saga 673,895 684,831 26,418 22,296 
Yamanashi 583,453 600,675 17,332 17,886 
Fukui 599,155 597,899 22,713 18,436 
Nara 564,607 583,828 23,096 17,816 
Okinawa 571,572 557,622 5,463 4,084 
Tottori 454,675 472,230 19,737 16,432 
Avera~e 1,190,703 1,275,252 55,233 58,111 
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(b) Index numbers (prefectural avel'age taken .s 100). 
Popula- Popula- PopuJa- C-daas Cd ... C-cla88 
Prefectures tion in tioD in tion in incomes incomes incomes 1920 1925 1930 in 1921 in 1926 in 1931 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Tokyo 300 352 393 744 844 1,106 
Osaka 216 239 257 405 488 580 
Hokkaido 198 195 204 132 155 167 
Hyogo J93 192 192 256 318 384 
Aichi 175 181 186 186 192 206 
Fukuoka 183 ISO 184 208 198 190 
Niigata 148 144 140 143 118 76 
Shizuoka 131 138 J32 98 100 81 
Nagano 132 127 126 !II 114 57 
Hiroshima 130 126 124 1!l 104 111 
Kanagawa III HI 118 143 112 147 
Kagoshima lI9 116 114 54 55 48 
Kyoto 108 110 114 154 178 210 
Fukushima 115 113 110 71 60 40 
Ibaraki 114 III 109 76 65 42 
Chiba 112 110 108 75 65 53 
Saitama III 109 107 78 68 52 
Kiumamoto 104 102 99 107 103 77 
Okayama 103 97 94 93 81 72 
Nagasaki 96 91 90 77 71 64 
Gumma 88 89 87 72 65 48 
Gifu 90 89 88 65 61 44 
Mi. 90 88 85 77 65 55 
Miyagi 81 83 83 59 61 48 
Ehima 88 87 83 62 64 53 
Tochiki 88 87 83 82 66 46 
Yamaguchi 88 87 83 104 83 72 
Yamagata 81 82 79 70 60 37 
Akita 76 74 72 61 54 32 
Iwate 71 71 71 37 37 27 
Oita 72 72 69 71 58 48 
Aomori 64 64 64 35 33 25 
Wakayama 63 62 61 42 41 37 
Toyama 61 59 57 55 51 :!9 
Miyazaki 55 55 56 35 35 28 
Ishikawa 63 59 54 49 42 36 
Simane 60 57 54 51 42 30 
Kagawa 57 55 53 39 33 25 
Koehi 56 54 52 30 30 25 
Tokushima 56 54 52 30 24 20 
Shiga 55 52 51 44 39 34 
Saga 57 54 51 48 38 24 
Yamanashi 49 48 46 31 31 I 23 
Fukui 50 47 45 41 32
1 
26 
Nara 47 46 44 42 31 , 31 
Okinawa 48 44 42 10 7' 6 




Average 100 170 100 100 100 100 
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economic power rather than reflecting economic power itself, 
and as, moreover, the progressive rates are applied. Thus, 
calculations have been made, in respect of all prefectures, 
about the two items of population (as it stood on October 
1st of 1920, 1925 and 1930, when censuses were taken) and 
C·c1ass incomes (in 1921, in 1926 and in 1931). 
It is for two reasons that, in the calculation, in the 
C·c1ass incomes, the figures for the year following that taken 
for population have in each case been selected. One reason 
is that dividends came to be taxed as C·c1ass income in and 
after the fiscal year 1921-1922, and the other reason is that 
the actual revenues for the previous year, instead of the 
budgetary estimates, have been taken as the standard of 
calculation. 
In order to show how local inequality in population and 
in incomes has changed during the past ten years, I have 
prepared Table No. 6 on the basis of the index number 
given in Table No.5. 
Table No.6. 
Inequality in prefectural population and wealth. 
I I Max. Q, M MI Q, I Min.!1 T, • 5 
Population I in 
1920 309 115 100 88 60 38 I 39 53 -0,018 
! 
1925 352 113 100 87 57 37
1 
41 58 -0.071 
1930 393 114 100 53 54 ~I~ 64 +0.033 C-class in· 
comes in I 
1921 744 107 100 71 42 10 64 117 +0,108 
1926 844 103 100 61 38 7 73 137 +0.292 
1931 1.106 76 100 46 30 6 94 179 +0.304 
Table No. 6 shows that the skewness of population is 
changing for minus (-0.018) to plus (+ 0.033) and that the 
skewness of the C·cIass incomes is steadily adding to its 
plus status (from + 0.108 to + 0.304). Again, both in mean 
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deviation and in standard deviation, population and the C· 
class incomes are both steadily on the increase, the tendency 
to increase being more marked in the C-class incomes (in 
which mean deviation was 64 in 1921, 73 in 1926, and 94 in 
1931 ; and standard deviation 117 in 1921, 137 in 1926, and 
179 in 1931) than in population (in which mean deviation 
was 39 in 1920, 41 in 1925, and 43 in 1930; and standard 
deviation 53 in 1920, 58 in 1925 and 64 in 1930). 
It can thus be proved by figures that inequality in pre· 
fectural population has increased during the last ten years 
and the inequality in prefectural incomes has grown even 
at a greater rate during the interval. 
4. UNFAIR INCIDENCE OF THE TAX BURDEN 
AND REMEDIAL MEASURES 
The concentration of wealth in big cities produces far· 
reaching financial effects-especially as regards the burden 
of taxation. I shall study its effects on national taxes, direct 
and indirect, and on local taxes. 
1. The loss of balance in the incidence of direct taxes. 
The incomes, the land, and the business profit taxes form 
the three principal direct national taxes. The A·class income 
tax is levied on the incomes of juridical persons, and as 
juridical persons are largely concentrated in big cities, the 
revenues from this source are especiallY large in big cities. 
The B·class income tax is collected at the source, and there· 
fore it is not clear where the tax· bearers live, but so far it 
is obvious that it does not bring much revenue to the local 
finance of rural districts. In the C·c1ass income tax, the 
taxable limit is fixed at an income of ¥1,200, and owing to 
the marked decline in the incomes of farmers because of 
the fall in the prices of rice and cocoons, the payers of this 
tax are mostly inhabitahts of big cities. The business profit 
tax is undoubtedly an urban tax, as it is imposed on 
merchants and industrialists. On the other hand, the land 
tax is primarily rural by nature. Whereas it ought to fall 
------_ .•..• ----- .---.-------~ 
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chiefly on rural districts, however, it is gradually losing its 
characteristic as an impost on farmers. This is partly be· 
cause the land tax is reduced in agrarian communities on 
account of the system of tax exemption, under which it is 
remitted in favour of yeoman farmers, and partly because 
the rental value of land, which furnishes the basis of assess· 
ment, amounted to ¥292.750,OOO in the six big cities on April 
1st, 1926, or 17 per cent. of the total amount for the whole 
country, viz., ¥l,734,710,OOO. In so far as direct national 
taxes are concerned, the incidence of taxatioa is thus com· 
paratively fair, the burden being lighter in rural districts 
than in urban. 
The sake tax and the Tobacco Monopoly profit constitute 
the two principal indirect national taxes in Japan. As indirect 
taxes are levies the burden of which is shifted by tax·payers 
to the shoulders of tax·bearers, the places where these taxes 
are paid are not identical with the places where those who 
actually bear them live. Consequently, the relations of the 
incidence of the burden are not clear. On a general view, 
however, it is obvious that as men in the prime of life are 
the chief consumers of sake and tobacco, the burden of 
indirect national taxation increases in the six big cities where 
there is an increases in the number of such people. Statistics, 
indeed, testify to this tendency. Seeing, however, that excise 
duties are poll·taxes, so to speak, and, unlike direct taxes, 
carry no provisions for taxable limits, progressive rates and 
deduction rules, they fall comparatively more heavily on rural 
people than on the inhabitants of big cities. 
Direct national taxes weight less heavily on rural districts 
than on urban, and it is fair to conclude that it is indirect 
rather than direct national taxes under which agrarian com· 
munities are groaning. It is, however, local taxes which 
press particularly hard on farmers. I shall, therefore, ex· 
plain how these taxes, prefectural and municipal, town or 
village, hear on them. 
One of the most important of prefectural taxes is the 
house tax, which is assessed on the basis of rental value. 
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The figures for 1931 show that the six big cities account 
for 26 per cent. of the total rental value of houses, and 
the other districts for 74 per cent. But although the 
six big cities thus account for a large proportion of the 
total rental value of houses, all prefectures are eager to 
derive as much revenue as possible from the house tax. For 
this reason, the house tax falls more heavily on rural dis· 
tricts than on urban. As other prefectural taxes may be 
mentioned the miscellaneous tax, the special land tax, and 
the business tax. In addition, surtaxes are imposed on vari-
ous national taxes. These taxes also fall comparatively 
lightly on the inhabitants of the prefectures in which the 
big cities are located. 
The most important of the municipal, town and vilJage 
taxes is kosuwari (household rate). It is a well·known fact 
that this particular levy is heavier in rural districts than in 
urban. National and prefectural surtaxes also fall most 
lightly on the inhabitants of the six big cities, and they 
bear less hard on the inhabitants of other cities than on 
rural inhabitants, who are thus taxed most heavily. 
As it is impossible to examine the total amount of tax 
burden in respect of each district, I have confined my atten· 
tion to the burden of direct taxes only, to the exclusion of 
indirect taxes. The figures in the following table show the 
amount of tax burden in the six cities, in the other cities 
and in the rural districts, respectively, as regards direct 
national taxes, prefectural taxes, and city, town and vilJage 
taxes:-
Table No.7. Bu,den of 
Total amount of burden (In ¥l,OCO) 
Total i Direct na~: I Prefectural I I :~~ci:~ I tional taxes taxes village 
,---------------,'--------r-------i---n ..·"'·'~f--------I 
'-Rural districts I 120,854 I 161.917 ~I' 210,494 
{
Six big cities I 129,684 37.865 64,569 
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If we take the burden of direct national taxes as 100 
and on this basis work out the burdens of prefectural taxes, 
city, town or village taxes, and the total direct taxes in per· 
centages, interesting facts emerge. Basing my calculations 
on the figures for 1931. I find that the prefectural taxes 
borne by the six big cities were 29. the municipal taxes 50 
and all direct taxes 179 as against 100 for direct national 
taxes. That is to say, they bore in that year local taxes 
corresponding to about 80 per cent. of direct national taxes. 
With regard to the other cities, the percentages are 73 for 
prefectural taxes, 102 for municipal taxes, and 275 for all 
direct taxes. In other words, they bore local taxes equivalent 
in amount to 170 per cent. of direct national taxes. The 
percentages for rural districts are 134 in prefectural taxes. 
174 in town or village taxes, and 408 in all direct taxes. 
That is to say, rural districts bore in that year local taxes 
three times the amount of direct national taxes. Supposing 
that direct national taxes are fair in incidence and accord 
with the economic capacities of individual districts, the in· 
cidence of local taxes is obviously abnormal. for there are 
vast differences between the proportion of local taxes borne 
by the six big cities. the other cities and rural districts 
respectively. The first·mentioned bear local taxes which are 
lower than direct national taxes; the second·mentioned bear 
about twice as heavy a burden of local taxes as direct 
national taxes; and the last·mentioned bear local taxes of 
about three times the amount of direct national taxes. This 
direct taxes in 193]. 
Ratios (%) 
Direct national Prefectural I Municipal, town r 
taxes taxes I and viUage taxes j 
I 
100 134 174 
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unfair incidence of tax burdens tends to accentuate the 
tendency for rural inhabitants to move to the six big cities. 
Some people complain that for this reason many provincial 
landowners transfer their places of residence to big cities, 
instead of living where they own land, but before attacking 
these landowners, it is well for such critics to study earnestly 
the ways and means of removing defects in local finance-
in the local taxation system especially-which are responsi-
ble for the increase in the number of landowners who desert 
their native provinces. 
As it is thus clear that the incidence of taxation in the 
provinces is far from fair, effectual remedial measure must 
of necessity be devised. In the present article, I shall study 
three remedial plans, namely, the adjustment of local econo-
mic power, defrayal out of the national treasury of the 
expenditure in which local autonomous bodies are involved 
for the transaction of the business entrusted to them by the 
State, and grants-in-aid for the adjustment of local finance. 
1. Adjustment of local economic power. The funda-
mental cause of the unfairness in the incidence of the burden 
of taxation between urban and rural districts is to be found 
in the inequality of their economic power. In consepuence 
of the concentration of p~pulation-chiefly people in the 
prime of life-in big cities, and also of the concentration, 
even to a greater degree, of wealth in such cities, the balance 
of economic power between urban and rural districts was 
lost, and this inequality in economic power led to unfairness 
in the incidence of the burden of taxation. Whereas the 
burden of national taxes is uniform throughout the country, 
the incidence of local taxation is unfair, as already indicated. 
In such circumstances, it is only human that individuals or 
juridical persons should try to transfer their abodes or fac· 
tories to districts where local taxes are relatively low. For 
one thing, local landowners often leave their ancestral estates 
to live in big cities. It is said that the consideration of local 
taxes has considerable weight with a big company in its 
choice of site for a new factory. In this way, districts with 
---- ---------- ----
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weak economic power, where heavy local taxes are imposed, 
lose sources of revenue which centre in other districts with 
strong economic power, where the burden of local taxation 
is light. The result is the accentuation of the disparity in 
the incidence of the burden of taxation between urban and 
rural districts. Such being the case, if inequality in local 
finance is to be remedied fundamentally, it is necessary to 
restore the balance of economic power between urban and 
rural districts. To be more exact, either urban economic 
power must be reduced or rural economic power increased. 
Or the reduction of the former and the increase of the latter 
must be effected simultaneously. But it is well·nigh impossi· 
ble for such plans to be carried out effectually. 
Whereas it is impossible to adjust local economic power 
by such direct and drastic means, it is possible to achieve 
the end to a certain extent by reorganising the units of local 
finance, viz., prefectures, cities, towns or villages. What I 
mean is to harmonise regionalism in politics with regionalism 
in economics. The boundaries of prefectures, cities, towns 
and villages were, in their essentials, fixed in the Meiji era 
and are consequently, in many respects, hardly in keeping 
with the requirements of the present day. There can be no 
two opinions as to the need for reorganisation. Some people 
advocate the amalgamation of prefectures with economy of 
expenditure in view, but the reorganisation which I urge 
here is not from such motives: it aims at the re-demarcation 
of administrative districts in a manner which accords with 
the actual economic capacity of the districts concerned. 
Some prefectures may deem it advisable to amalgamate. 
Necessity may also suggest the merger of towns and villages 
or the creation of new villages. The idea of adjusting local 
economic power through the reform of the local administra· 
tive organ deserves attention. 
2. Defrayal out of the national treasury of the expense 
involved in the transaction of the State business entrusted 
to local autonomous bodies. Although it is desirable that 
through the above·mentioned re·assignment of administrative 
-----------------------.-------
---------~ 
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districts, an equilibrium should be restored in local economy 
and the fair incidence of the burden of local taxation secured, 
the work is obviously supremely difficult. This consideration 
has engendered the idea of re-examining the present division 
between national and local expenditure. One of the causes 
of the present distress of local finance is the heavy expendi-
ture involved in the transaction of the business entrusted by 
the State. The outlay on this head constitutes the major 
part of the local expenditure, so that only a little money is 
left available for the transaction of the business which is 
purely local. Such being the case, it is urged in some quar-
ters that either all or a large proportion of the cost involved 
in the transaction of State business should be defrayed out 
of the national treasury so as to relieve the local treasuries_ 
This suggestion has been discussed a good deal in the past. 
According to rough estimates for the fiscal year 1934-1935, 
the cost to prefectures of the transaction of business bearing 
on State administration amounted to ¥440,OOO,OOO (73.8 per 
cent. of the total prefectural expenditure) and the cost to 
cities, towns and villages was Y988,000,000 (42.1 per cent. of 
the total city, town and village expenditure). The cost of 
transacting the business entrusted or the cost of transacting 
State business is not very clearly definable, but the cost 
which clearly falls into this category amounted in the fiscal 
year 1934-1935 to ¥195,OOO,OOO (32.8 per cent. of the total 
prefectural cost) in prefectural estimates and Y 306,000,000 
(23.5 per cent. of the total city, town and village expenditure) 
in city, town and village estimates, making a total of ¥502,-
000,000 (26.5 per cent. of the total local expenditure). It is 
a matter calling for remedy that the cost of State business 
entrusted to local autonomous bodies bears, as at present, so 
hard on local finance, on town and village finance especially, 
but when we come to consider the question of the proper 
proportion in which the State and local autonomous bodies 
should bear such cost, it is no easy take to devise con-
crete plans. 
3. Grants-in-aid for the adjustment of local finance. 
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The re-organisation of the administrative districts and the 
defrayal out of the national treasury of the cost involved in 
the transaction of the State business entrusted to local 
autonomous bodies are both plans the execution of which 
involves much time and difficulty. As an emergency and 
practical plan, therefore, it is now proposed that grants·in·aid 
should be allowed for the adjustment of local finance. This 
plan is not concerned with the remedy of the present ir' 
rational administrative organisation and the present inequality 
in local economic power. Nor does it propose to remove, in 
a direct way, the present pressure on local finance of the 
cost involved in the transaction of State business entrusted 
to local autonomous bodies. It is an expedient aiming at 
the removal, without undue delay, of the unfair incidence of 
tax burden, arising from inequality in local finance. As this 
question of grants·in·aid now forms the nucleus of the 
reform of local finance, I shall deal with it further in the 
next chapter. 
5. GRANTS-IN-AID FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF 
LOCAL FINANCE 
This plan was originally the private scheme of certain 
Home Office officials, but it has gradually gained such wide 
support that it now predominates and constitutes the main 
subject for discussion both in the National Policy Council 
and in the Enquiry Bureau of the Cabinet. 
1. Contents of the plan. The propossed grants-in-aid 
are funds to be supplied by the State to the local autonomous 
bodies for the purpose of remedying the unfair incidence of 
the burden of local taxation. In order to provide the neces· 
sary money, the State is to increase national taxes or to 
create a new tax, the resulting increased revenue being 
handed over to the local autonomous bodies. In distributing 
grants·in-aid among these bodies, care is to be taken to see 
that the poorer bodies receive more than those in more 
affluent circumstances. 
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As suitable sources of revenue from which to finance 
the grants-in·aid, a 50 per cent. increase in the B·class in· 
come tax (¥12,627,000), a 100 per cent. increase in the tax 
on interest on capital (¥14,903,000) and a 100 per cent. in-
crease in the death duties (¥28,983,000) are suggested. The 
advisability of creating a new tax on proceeds is also consi· 
dered in some quarters, but the present plan does not 
include it. The taxes mentioned above would not be unduly 
burdensome, for, unlike other taxes on profits, no local 
surtaxes are levied on such taxes for reasons connected with 
taxation technique. Such being the case, they naturally 
claim first attention whenever the question of increasing 
national taxes is on the tapis, let alone the present instance 
of providing a new source of revenue for financing grants· 
in-aid for the adjustment of local finance. And it is with 
good reason that they are fixed upon as the suitable sources 
of revenue. 
Grants·in-aid for the adjustment of local finance ought 
to be devoted to the reduction of local taxes. According to 
the latest edition of the .. Summary of Local Finance," the 
highest, the lowest and the average rates of prefectural taxes 
imposed in different prefectures in the fiscal year 1934-1935 
were such as are given in the following table:-
I Land Special land Business I Income I House tax surtax tax profit tax I surtax 
I 
Highest 1.724 0.654 0.794 : 0.410 , 1.830 
(Okinawa {Okinawa (Miyagi ! (Miyagi i (Oshima, 
pref.) pref.) pref.) ! pref.) I Kagoshima 
, : pref.) 
Lowest 0.570 0.111 0.465 I 0.240 i 0.065 (Tokyo pref.) (Osaka pref.) (Tol,yo pre!.) ~Chiba pref')I(TokYO pref. 
! Osaka preq 
Average 1.337 O.SOl 0.710 i 0.374 0.422 , , 
It certainly is a deplorable phenomenon that the incidence 
of local taxation should be as unfair as is shown in the 
above table, and it is only proper that the grants·in·aid should 
be devoted to the reduction of local taxes, that is, prefectural 
,._-- -- -,---
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taxes (the reduction of imposts of all kinds in excess of 
legal limits, and the reduction of the house tax, the business 
tax and the miscellaneous tax) and city, town and village 
taxes (the reduction of the household rate, or the house sur· 
tax which is collected in some districts in lieu of the house· 
hold rate, the reduction of the imposts of all kinds in excess 
of legal limits, and the reduction of surtaxes on prefectural 
taxes in consequence of reduced prefectural taxes). 
As to the manner of distribution, it is so arranged that 
two·fifths of the total should be allotted to the prefectures 
and the other three-fifths to the cities, towns and villages. 
The funds for distribution are of two categories, ordinary 
and special. As the special fund represent less than one· 
tenth of the total amount of the funds for distribution, the 
ordinary funds embody the major proportion. The special 
funds are intended for prefectures or cities, towns or villages 
which are reduced to dire straits by special circumstances 
and are to be distributed in due consideration of these 
special circumstances. These funds are rather exceptional 
by nature. The ordinary funds are given to all districts 
without exception, and consequently the merits or demerits 
of the grants·in·aid may largely be judged by the standards 
by which these funds are distributed. The total of the 
ordinary grants is divided into three categories. One cate· 
gory has for its standard of distribution the incidence of 
taxes (distribution for prefectures to be made on the basis 
of the amount obtained by multiplying the amount by which 
the average per head of direct national taxes in the prefec· 
ture concerned falls short of the average per head of these 
taxes throughout the country by the prefectural population, 
while distribution for cities, towns and villages to be on the 
basis of the amount obtained by multiplying the amount by 
which the average per head of direct national taxes and 
prefectural taxes in the city, town or village concerned falls 
short of the average per head of such taxes throughout the 
country by the population of the locality concerned). Another 
category has for its standard of distribution the amount of 
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surtax (distribution for prefectures to be made on the basis 
of the amount obtained by multiplying the amount by which 
the average per head of surtaxes on direct national taxes in 
the prefecture concerned falls short of the average per head 
of such surtaxes throughout the country by the prefectural 
population, while distribution for cities, towns or villages to 
be made on the basis of the amount obtained by multiplying 
the amount by which the average per head of surtaxes on 
direct national taxes and prefectural taxes falls short of the 
average per head of such surtaxes throughout the country 
by the population of the locality concerned). The other 
category has population for its standard of distribution (dis· 
tribution for prefectures, or cities, towns or villages to be 
made on the basis of their respective populations). In short, 
the increased revenue from national taxes is to be given 
back, not uniformly, but at different rates, that is, in a 
larger proportion for those prefectures or cities, towns or 
villages which have limited economic power. In other words, 
districts with strong economic power are to be taxed for the 
relief of those with small economic power. It is for the 
successful attainment of this end that rather complex stand· 
ards of distribution have been adopted. In this respect, the 
proposed grants· in-aid plan has points of similarity with the 
State subsidy for compulsory education, and consequently 
both have common merits aud demerits. 
Now I have explained the obiect, the source of revenue 
and the standards of distribution in regard to the grants-in-
aid for the adiustment of local finance and shown that this 
plan has good ground to stand upon. Though commendable 
in conception, its execution deserves most careful study. 
As it embodies an epoch-making innovation in the Japanese 
financial system, the utmost circumspection must be used 
in carrying it out_ 
2. Practicability of the projected grants-in-aid for the 
adjustment of local finance_ The plan of grants-in-aid for 
the adjustment of local finance under discussion is not 
intended as a temporary expedient which operates for a 
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year or two. It is to constitute a permanent burden on the 
national finance as a sort of ordinary expenditure. Tbere 
must, therefore, be a sure source of ordinary revenue to 
finance it. It is for this reason tbat an increase is contem-
plated in the B-class income tax, that is to say, in the tax 
on interest, on capital and on inheritance. Whether or no 
tbe plan can be put through depends, therefore, on the 
possibility of increasing these taxes. But it would be too 
hasty to conclude that the possibility of such increase is the 
only condition of the realisation of the scheme. It is essen-
tial that the increased portion of these taxes should not be 
employed for the defrayal of national and other local ex-
penditure. Only when the two conditions-the increase of 
taxes, and the non·employment of the increased portion of 
taxes for other purposes-are fulfilled can the plan of grants-
in-aid for the adjustment of local finance be carried out. 
6. CONCLUSION 
All economic discussions in Japan for about a dozen 
years after the World-War turned on the axis of class strife. 
In the discussion of economic life in Japan, nobody took the 
trouble to compare urban life with rural. All discussions 
centred on the relative positions of the propertied and non-
propertied classes, regardless of regional considerations. 
There was hardly any economic argument which made no 
reference to rivalry between the bourgeoisie and the prole-
tariat and to class strife. In financial discussions also, 
attention was confined to the rival existence of the two 
classes of people, the propertied and the non-propertied. 
Distinctions between cities and villages, between farmers and 
merchants and industrialists, or between Japan and other 
countries, weighed little with theorists in whose eyes there 
existed the above-mentioned two classes of people and 
nothing else. This offers a striking contrast to what is 
now taking place. 
Now the chief interest attaches to the comparative study 
l 
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of economic life in urban and rural districts and the inci-
dence of the burden of taxation on farmers and on merchants 
and industrialists. On the other hand, the question of class 
strife has receded into the background altogether. Thus, the 
reform of local finance is being strongly urged and the 
question of grants-in-aid for the adjustment of local finance 
is attracting a good deal of public attention. The question 
of the reform of local finance covers a very wide field. Big 
cities have many problems the settlement of which is long 
overdue, such as, for example, public utility enterprises and 
the introduction of the special municipality system. Even 
confinding attention to the adjustment of unfairness in tax 
burdens in urban and rural districts, many remedial measures 
may be suggested, such as the reform of the administrative 
organisation, the defrayal out of the national treasury of the 
expense involved in the transaction of the State business 
entrusted to local autonomous bodies, and the reduction of 
the burden of indirect taxation. The grants-in-aid plan for 
the adjustment of local finance is merely one of the many 
remedial measures possible. Wh.i1e, no doubt, it marks an 
advance that the vague discussion of class strife has been 
discarded in favour of the more practical debate on the 
question of giving grants-in-aid to local governments for 
financial adjustment, the fact remains that there are many 
measures, besides this particular one, for the reform of 
local finance. 
It is usual that inequality in the burden of taxation in 
urban and rural districts suggests to many minds the victi-
misation of one by the other, but thie sweeping generalisa-
tion is wrong. For instance, it was not by the victimisation 
of rural interests that urban roads have been improved 
markedly in recent years. The money required for their 
improvement has been raised by the special town-planning 
tax and by the special contributions made by beneficiaries. 
About 60 per cent. of the Tokyo and Osaka citizens hail 
from rural districts, and these people are benefiting rural 
districts directly or indirectly. In drawing up detailed plans 
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of grants-in-aid for the adiustment of local finance, therefore, 
it is desirable that drafters should go about their work in 
the spirit of promoting the common prosperity of urban 
and rural districts_ According to the mood in which this 
question is handled, the proposed grants-in-aid may either 
accentuate or alleviate the sense of rivalry or antagonism 
between urban and rural districts_ 
Although the question of grants-in-aid for the adiustment 
of local finance is now chiefly under discussion in the direc-
tion of the reform of local finance, there are many other 
problems caIling for attention for the attainment of the end 
in view_ Again, there are many conditions which must be 
fulfilled before the plan of grants-in-aid can be carried out_ 
It is to be hoped that the National Policy Council and the 
Enquiry Bureau of the Cabinet will keep these facts in mind 
and work out reform plans which can bring State and local 
finance into harmony, so that true accord between urban 
and rural people can be achieved_ 
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